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ABSTRACT 
The recent crisis of 2008 has revealed several challenges for the economic science, sparking a 
considerable  amount  of  debate  regarding  the  profession  of  economists  and  the  role  of 
macroeconomics and monetary policies. The first question that arose was why there was a lack 
of anticipation of the crisis (especially from the mainstream economists) and, secondly, how 
could policy makers “fix the economy” after the crash of the markets. The metaphor “economics 
as a machine” is a good reflection of how people think of the economy and economists today, 
although  the  author  of  this  paper,  among  many  other  researchers,  believes  otherwise. 
Therefore, this paper gives preliminary answers to the questions above and describes today’s 
challenges to macroeconomic models and to monetary policy frameworks in particular, in terms 
of methodology.  
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1.Introduction 
The fallacies of today’s view on the economy at national and international level have been 
exacerbated  by  the  recent  events  in  the  world,  mainly  by  the  sub-prime  crisis  and  its 
transformation in a global economic crisis. Economists and policy makers have been put in a 
difficult  situation,  trying  to  find  causes  for  the  crisis  and  solutions  to  it.  Their  inability  in 
foreseeing the events of the last four years is explained by many as a failure of the models used 
to evaluate complex financial assets or of the macroeconomic models used to set monetary 
policy by central banks. Therefore, in their opinion, the economists should work at designing 
new more complex and encompassing models in order to better predict such infrequent events 
(Colander et al., 2009: pp. 257-259, Sollow, 2003). Other researchers believe these fallacies are 
inherent by default, as one cannot consider “economics as a machine” or macroeconomics as  
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being “hydraulic” (Kling, 2009) for several reasons, but the economy resembles much more an 
ecosystem (Borders, 2011). The paper addresses the problems raised by the use of modern 
macroeconomic  models  while  the  critics  of  the  present  theories,  models  and  policy 
recommendations in economics will be approached from two perspectives: a theoretical one, 
more general (Section 2- The general view), and a technical one with concrete deficiencies 
found in the macroeconomic models used so far (Section 3- The case of monetary policies). The 
discussion is rooted, from a methodological perspective, in what is today seen as heterodox 
economics. This topic will not be tackled in the present paper, as it does not represent the scope 
of it and is better suited for an entire separate study. Instead, the article critically analyzes 
macroeconomic models and is intended to be a starting point for debate, while further rigorous 
research is necessary. 
 
2. The General View 
In his Nobel Prize Lecture, Frederich A. Hayek pointed out the error of “the scientistic attitude”, 
comprising of trying to mechanically apply “habits of thought to fields different from those in 
which they have been formed”. Hayek was comparing social sciences with physical sciences, the 
latter being able to use measurable information and make precise predictions. But the field of 
economics is different and we seem not to acknowledge this: although the quantitative data is 
limited and may not include important information, we still try to predict patterns with the 
pretence of exact knowledge.  
If we had access to complete information, the answer to the optimal allocation of resources 
problem would be mathematical (Hayek, 1945), and, thus, the economy would be run just by 
governments pushing the right buttons. But in reality, information is initially dispersed among all 
people, there exists an important amount of unorganized knowledge – the knowledge of the 
particular circumstances of time and place – giving some advantage to every individual over all 
others (Hayek, 1945). Plus, information is constantly changing and the importance of change 
isn’t  quite  acknowledged.  In  Hayek’s  words  from  1945,  economists  are  preoccupied  “with 
statistical aggregates, which show a very much greater stability than the movements of the 
detail.” Nowadays, the topic seems more contemporary than ever.     
Besides the problem of complete information, one other general reason why economists failed 
to predict the current crisis is the fact that we are human beings and the markets are the result 
of our interactions. You cannot compare the economy with a machine, as machines are created 
by the human mind, they can break and be repaired. Instead, the economy and its evolutions 
find themselves in a constant change, many times giving surprising outcomes precisely because 
they are functioning based on human decisions and actions, which are many times emotional 
decisions, and not necessarily rational.  
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Therefore, it is not unusual that economists reached the conclusion that within the last hundred 
years the crisis occurrence was random (Jordà et al., 2010: p.36, Taleb, 2007) and that, even 
more, the incidence of financial crises has increased continuously after the abandonment of the 
Bretton-Woods system (Bordo et al., 2001: p. 7), without any clear explanations. Mainstream 
economics has tried to find causes for the recurring financial crises, without managing to give a 
convincing business cycle theory or crisis theory, since economists and policy makers always 
seem to be taken by surprise by the occurring financial crisis. One theory that could have a great 
explanatory power is the  one elaborated by the Austrian School of Economics.  It considers that 
a crisis is caused by malinvestments induced at the monetary level, by lowering the interest rate 
below  its  equilibrium  rate  or  by  artificially  creating  new  money.  The  recovery  cannot  be 
achieved through new government intervention, but only after settling the erroneous capital 
investment (allowing firms and banks to go bankrupt) and restoring the coordination function of 
prices. I will not develop the theory because the purpose of this paper is not to explore the 
Austrian business cycle theory and its validity, but to understand the fallacies of the current 
macroeconomic  models  used  in  making  important  decisions  for  the  national  and  world 
economy.   
The current macroeconomic models are highly criticized for the fact that they do not take into 
account the heterogeneity of actors taking part in the economy and the heterogeneity of their 
decision  making  process.  The  representative-agent  model  and  the  rational-expectation 
hypothesis have not been empirically validated and have a great role in the unrealistic approach 
to model the economy (Colander et al., 2009: pp. 256-257, Sollow, 2003: pp. 1-2). Thus, the 
representative  agent means  that  only  one  individual  is  considered  for  the  entire  economy, 
homogenizing the various kinds of market participants. The rational-expectation assumption 
gives the agents the capability to know how the economy works, by implying that they have 
complete information about the probability distribution of all future events. Obviously, these 
hypothesis largely used in modern macroeconomics are far from describing the reality. Plus, the 
models are not encompassing the possibility of a real disturbance and its effect (Sollow, 2003: 
p.3), their methodology lacking the notions of “systemic risk” or “coordination failure” (Colander 
et al., 2009: p. 258). Accordingly, the predictions made by different models using them have 
been  erroneous,  both  in  forecasting  the  financial  market  evolutions  and  in  forecasting  the 
economic growth of the economies. 
In particular, the mathematical devices and risk-management models gave confidence to market 
players.  They  were  under  the  impression  that  nothing  can  go  wrong,  everything  can  be 
determined and more trading and creation of even more complex financial instruments based 
on these models were encouraged. But the models consistently ignored systemic risks and gave 
only an approximate for real-world dynamics (Colander et al., 2009: p. 254).   Moreover, one of 
the current crisis causes is seen as being the sophistication of the 2007 financial products that 
made their risk not to be correctly evaluated by rating agencies and for which there was a 
challenge even to determine the market price (Schwarz, 2009: p. 47). Therefore, the current 
crisis  revealed  the  weaknesses  of  the  mathematical  portfolios,  asset-pricing  and  risk- 
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management models.  Some economists are of the opinion that there is a need for an ethical 
code for professional economic scientists, since they didn't indicate to the public the difficulties 
and the flaws in their models. In the same spirit, Nassim Nicholas Taleb (2007) believes that the 
Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences legitimizes the mathematical models that incorrectly assess 
the risks and, so, the investors are exposed to understated risks because of these models they 
are using and trusting. But in his opinion, the financial market patterns do not exist,  their 
evolutions being random. 
In conclusion, the mathematical modeling of the economy and the financial instruments’ risk 
assessment models in particular, lacks complete information. It is physical impossible, at least 
for the time being, to create an all-encompassing model. Plus, the aggregates used as variables 
have the shortcoming of hiding the variations of the details. The imperfect frameworks give 
some insights on the functioning of markets and participants' behavior, but, as we have seen, 
cannot accurately forecast the evolution of the economy or sector of the economy. However, 
policy makers use the modern macroeconomic models as instruments when taking decisions, 
despite  their  weaknesses,  and  one  of  the  fields  in  which  mathematical  modeling  has  an 
important role is monetary policy conducted, usually, by a central bank. 
 
3. The Case of Monetary Policies 
The  current  crisis  has  showed  that monetary  policies  have  unexpected  results  and  that  no 
central  banker  can  thoroughly  predict  the  outcome  of  a  monetary  policy  measure  they 
implement. The expansionary monetary policy of central banks in 2001 participated in fueling  
an   unsustainable   credit   boom,   especially   in   the   real   estate   sector. The inflationary 
policy was a response to the crisis in the IT sector in the late '90s and to concerns about a 
possible  recession  after  the  terrorist  attacks  of  11  September  2001.  The  change  in  Fed’s 
monetary policy stance by making credit more expensive and raising the federal funds rate was 
a factor which revealed the 2007 crisis, the consequence of this measure being the default of 
sub-prime mortgages. 
The limited success of monetary policies has been visible even before 2007. It was observed that 
the Federal Reserve System (Fed) had been periodically creating   recessions,   through   “go-
stop”   policies,   in   order   to   stop inflation, after trying (unsuccessfully in the last decades) to 
increase employment (Goodfriend, 2007: p 4.). This meant that the Fed allowed inflation and 
inflation  expectations  to  move  higher  with  the  purpose  of reducing  unemployment,  but as 
inflation rose, the main target would move to restraining inflation by tightening the monetary 
policy, thus switching to the “stop” phase of the policy cycle. Market anticipations of this kind of 
monetary policy lead Fed, eventually, to losing its room to maneuver between “go” and “stop” 
policy (Goodfriend, 2007: p 4.). 
The effectiveness of monetary policy and its impact on the real economy is also influenced by 
the current banking system. The central banks have control only over the monetary base – M0  
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and M1-, while the commercial banks are the ones that multiply money through the fractional 
reserve system, by expanding credit and fueling crisis. Figure one show the great power of 
private banking in increasing the money supply, the difference between M0 and M1 on one side, 
and M2 and M3 on the other side being tremendous. Consequently, even if the monetary 
authorities do not intend to considerably enlarge the money supply, an increase in the monetary 
base (by printing money or by reducing the reference rate, and so, expanding lending) may lead 
to  much  more  cheap money  than  predicted  and  to  unwanted  outcomes  such  as  the  2008 
financial crisis (by  reacting to the 2001 recession fears - the broad money supply M2 expanded 
rapidly in the years of the dot-com boom and even more rapidly in response to the dot-com 
bust). This happens also because the commercial banks make different choices as regard to their 
reserves  and  loan-loss  provisions  (within  the  banking  regulations  framework)  and  central 
bankers do not hold complete information. 
 
Figure 1   Global Money Supply, 1971-2009 (in billions) 
 
Source: Gustavson (2010), p. 9. 
Another issue that raised debates has been the use of discretionary policy (the central bank 
intervenes whenever it considers necessary, in order to achieve its inflation targeting goal or to 
try eliminate excessive unemployment) versus policy rule (the conduct of policy as a systematic 
response to incoming information about economic conditions, as opposed to a period-by-period 
optimization problem).  One can give as example of the latter choice of policy, the Taylor rule, 
which was based on the U.S. experience in the late 1980s and early 1990s. It implied that “the 
federal funds rate (r) should normatively (with qualifications) be set, and could positively be 
explained, by a simple equation:   r = p + 1/2y + 1/2(p-2) + 2, where y represents the percent 
deviation of real GDP from trend and p represents the rate of inflation over the previous four 
quarters.  With inflation on its assumed target of 2 percent and real GDP growing on its trend 
path of roughly 2 percent per year (so that y=0), the real ex post interest rate (r-p) would also 
equal 2” (Asso et al., 2010: p.1). As we can see, the approach is a mechanical one, by setting the  
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federal funds rate without knowing if it is the natural rate or not. Thus, it is not surprising that 
the outcomes may contribute to fostering a financial crisis.   
Although the Taylor-type rules have been used in describing past policies or future policy sets, 
the culture of discretion (equivalent to unpredictable and sometimes politically biased monetary 
policies) has not been abandoned. Still, they have served as benchmarks for policymakers in 
assessing the current stance of monetary policy and in determining a future policy path. But 
monetary policy models are not exempted by the errors and obstacles described in the previous 
section of this paper. As we have seen, the monetary system and the economy are treated as a 
machine to which one can apply a reference rate either by following an equation or by using 
one’s instinct or beliefs. The impact of the decision does not concern and does not influence 
only the policy maker, but the entire participants in the economy. Many times the results of 
these policies are surprising, leading to recessions or even crisis. In addition, “one obvious 
problem with financial crises, looking at it from a policy perspective, is that financial imbalances 
and distress are not built into the economic models that policymakers make use of.” (Gustavson, 
2011: p.20). Still, one may say that an imperfect model is better than no model at all.  
Two opposing views, — the Fed view and the one of a group of economists at the Bank for 
International  Settlements  (BIS)  —  are  summarized  in  Table  1,  containing  associated  policy 
prescriptions for how central banks should respond to asset booms and busts. The model that 
has prevailed in mainstream macroeconomics has been the Fed view, but the debate is not over 
yet, since Fed failed in “fixing” the economy, as expected. The BIS view suggests a more non-
active policy and prudential approach. 
Table 1   Fed vs. BIS Views in the Years Preceding the Financial Crisis 
Fed view  BIS view 
Asset bubbles can’t be identified before they 
burst. 
There are several indicators of financial imbalances, 
among others rapid credit growth and household and 
corporate debt as well as asset prices diverging 
strongly from historical trends. 
The central bank should “clean up” the mess 
after a bubble bursts. 
The central bank should “lean” against asset bubbles 
by tightening money. 
The costs of raising interest rates, in the form 
of lost output in the short run, are too high. 
The costs of letting financial bubbles getting out of 
hand are too high in the long run. 
Price stability should be the central bank’s 
main goal. 
Price stability is not enough. 
Pre-emptive easing should be used to help 
distressed financial markets. 
Pre-emptive tightening should be used to make sure 
financial imbalances don’t get out of hand. 
Source: Gustavson  (2010), p.22.  
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Finally, the policy responses to the current crisis meant injecting a huge amount of liquidity in 
the banking system (following Fed’s view of cleaning up the mess after the bubble burst). All 
this, in spite of the fact that from a historical point of view, the cost of the crises has been higher 
as the liquidity support to insolvent banks led to irresponsible behavior, and practically fueled 
moral hazard (Bordo et al., 2000: pp. 23-24). But   today’s   crisis   hasn’t   been   solved   by   the   
Keynesian measures of stimulating the economy (setting a lax monetary policy with a federal 
funds rate near zero, bailing out some financial institutions)  and the jobs supposed to be 
created by them have been actually destroyed, as a result (Conley, Dupor, 2011). 
 
 
4. Conclusions  
The  main  conclusion  is  that  macroeconomic  models  and  monetary  policy  frameworks  in 
particular, have clearly design errors and cannot closely reproduce the reality. This happens as a 
consequence of the lack of complete information, and the unrealistic assumptions made, but 
also as a lack of control over the policy effects, especially in the banking sector. As a result, 
errors appear in forecasting policy outcomes or financial crises. The models give some kind of 
image overall, but must not be taken as absolute truth. The practice shows otherwise, and the 
modern central banks are believed to possess a broad macroeconomic outlook that entitles 
them to monetary planning and intervention. The challenge remains in creating better, more 
complex  and  comprehensive  models  although  the  present  researcher’s  opinion  is  that  the 
mathematical approach will never succeed in reproducing the reality in a satisfactory manner 
such as to effectively use the public policy tools as instruments for running the economy. The 
economy, as a result of human action and interaction, is hardly foreseeable. 
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